

## Constructing the Cultural Landscape in Southwest Asia

**Note:** This is the author's version of the paper by the same title presented at the Sharjah Urban Planning Symposium in April, 2004. Although it is rumored to have been published in a "Proceedings of...", I have never seen any evidence that this actually happened – so – I suppose it should be cited (if at all) as follows: Addison, E. 2004. Constructing the cultural landscape of southwest Asia. Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Sharjah Urban Planning Symposium (SUPS7). United Arab Emirates, April 2-6, 2004.

### Abstract

The following paper addresses the balance – or tension – between globalization and cultural integrity in the cultural heritage management of southwest Asia. The thesis contends that the management of southwest Asia's cultural remains is shaped by the interlocked demands of tourism and global politics in such a way that the visible historical landscape is largely devoid of Arab-Islamic remains. This trend is the result of three related factors within the planning community: negligence, scarcity of resources for cultural heritage management (and for the conservation of Islamic remains in particular); international state policy focusing on the development of biblical remains for ideological (e.g., in Israel) or for economic reasons (as in Jordan). One might argue that it is not economically viable – especially in stressed economies such as Jordan's or Palestine's – to expend scarce resources on cultural heritage conservation. One goal of my work is to suggest that careful consideration of and investment in cultural heritage conservation is not a luxury and should not be neglected at the regional planning level

The analysis is derived both from fieldwork and archival study. State policy is assessed by measuring material inputs into cultural heritage management (roads, signs, funding for conservation of material remains). Field research between 1998 and 2003 has documented access to and facilities on all of the early Islamic sites in Jordan, Palestine, and Israel and all of the millennium pilgrimage sites in Jordan, Jerusalem, and northern Israel. In this region, the so-called "holy land," the tension between global dynamics and regional identity is articulated in terms of the conservation of classical, Biblical and Islamic material remains.

Cultural remains are powerful symbols which compose a text inscribed on the landscape and read by everyone who travels through it. To erase the material remains of a culture is one part of the process of erasing its historical and contemporary political efficacy, not to mention its identity. It is equally important, however, to recognize that all editing of this text – all landscape transformation – *constructs* a narrative of cultural identity for those who inhabit it.

## Constructing the Cultural Landscape in Southwest Asia

Practical editing decisions about cultural heritage conservation are inevitable: it is a simple fact that for a wide variety of reasons not everything *can* be conserved. In best-case scenarios these decisions are based on policy that considers local, global and scholarly values along with the inevitable financial and logistical concerns. In southwest Asia heritage conservation is especially fraught with political implications – not only national, but religious and global in scope. In Jordan the conservation of Ottoman period and later remains calls up questions about Jordanian identity and, thereby, Hashemite legitimacy. Conservation of Jewish cultural remains there acknowledges that Judaism was an historical presence on the East Bank. In Israel and Palestine the conservation of Islamic remains casts doubt on the Israeli-American portrayal of pre-war Palestine as a "desert," empty and available for settlement and development.

In the introduction to their upcoming volume entitled *Marketing Heritage*, editors Baram and Rowan point out that "the bundle of processes involved in globalization is subsuming nationalism" (Baram and Rowan, 2004).<sup>1</sup> Throughout the Muslim world the conservation and scholarship of the Umayyad period raises questions about traditional Islamic religio-historical narratives. In an example we will examine more closely in a moment, Jordan's Islamic remains are systematically neglected and obscured to accommodate the sensibilities of Euramerican tourism, but more importantly to encourage the huge investment of U.S. foreign aid which undergirds the regime. Thus, for a tangle of related reasons which include nationalism, religious ideology, the internal legitimization of political regimes, economics and global political affiliations, the management of southwest Asia's cultural heritage is being shaped in such a way that the visible historical landscape is largely devoid of Arab-Islamic remains.

### **The Nationalist Landscape<sup>2</sup>**

In the summer of 2000 a colleague and I toured the Julan, or Golan, to document Islamic remains there. The *sine qua non* of the visit was to photograph the site of Umayyad period mosque within the qasr at Khirbet al-Minya. Minya is only 14 km north of Tabariyyah/ Teverye on Lake Tiberias, but it took a whole morning to find it. A well-paved road leads directly past it to a kibbutz. Although the impressive eighth-century Umayyad palace is within a few meters of the road, it was so overgrown that it is possible to miss it. There was no sign at the turn-off or site identifying the palace,

---

<sup>1</sup> Baram, Uzi and Rowan, Yorke (2004) *Marketing Heritage: Archaeology and the Consumption of the Past*, Walnut Creek: Alta Mira (*in press*). Because the volume is still in press, page numbers for this and the article by Joel Baumann, also in Baram and Rowan, are not yet available. By the time the SUPS7 papers go to press it will be possible to include these page numbers.

<sup>2</sup> For a searching discussion of this issue see Kohl, Philip L. and Fawcett, Clare (1995) *Nationalism, politics and the practice of archaeology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. for searching discussion – Kohl & Fawcett. In *Marketing Heritage* Baram & Rowan move the discussion into the global context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

though the kibbutz was well-signed. The structure was so neglected that palm trees rise ten meters high through the basalt and limestone pavements. One wing of the palace had been used as a dumpsite for debris from road construction. A tiny sign at knee height, half-hidden in the undergrowth, read: *do not damage the antiquities*.

On one major image search engine the entry *Khirbet al-Minya* (or any other entry containing *Minyah* or *Minya*) elicits only two results for the site, both references to antiquity. *Tabariyyah* pulls up two hits, *Lake Tiberias 70*, *Sea of Galilee 1,820*, and *Kinnaret* a grand 4,190.<sup>3</sup> Not one map yielded by this image search gave the names of Arabic communities or heritage sites in the "upper Galilee" or the Julan. Even advertisements for *kibbutzim*, however, welcomed Christian tourists and explicitly marketed the upper Galilee as "rich in Jesus" (Baumann, 2004). *Khirbet al-Minya* is one of the few remaining monumental early-Islamic sites left in Israel outside Jerusalem's Old City. Properly maintained, with no additional excavation or development, it could easily rival many of the antiquities sites in Israel. Given the present circumstances it will very soon indeed have, for all practical purposes, vanished.

The issue isn't just the obvious – that Arab history in Israel is being destroyed.<sup>4</sup> It is important to look, at the same time, at what is being *constructed*. Here I speak not only of the present, but the past: history is under construction, too. It is the history of Judaism and Christianity coexisting on land called Israel and amongst communities with Hebrew names. What is left in northern Israel and the occupied Golan is a landscape rich with both Jewish and Christian remains. What we find on the web consistently and explicitly links Christian and Jewish history – and omits to mention Islamic history at all. The "Holy Land" is made up entirely of Judaeo-Christian remains. In the public imagination it becomes increasingly counter-intuitive to credit Arab and/or Muslim interests in either the occupied territories or Jerusalem, as the visible landscape itself bears fewer and fewer traces of those interests in the past or present.

There are several points to countenance here: first, that the editing of Arab historical remains is not merely a "Palestinian" issue and is not carried out at mainly a military level. This editing proceeds as ongoing civil project, one of construction, not merely destruction. Joel Baumann explicates the dialectic between the archaeologies of destruction and construction in his analysis of Zippori National Park. Zippori is being built on the site of Saffuriyah, until 1948 one of the largest Palestinian villages in the Jalil/ Galilee (Baumann, 2004). It is a relatively new park notable for its late Roman period mosaics. It is interpreted by the INPA as a "liberal" and plural city where Jews

---

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.google.com>, accessed 28 January 2003. *Tabariyyah*, *Lake Tiberias*, *Sea of Galilee*, and (*Yam*) *Kinnaret* are, respectively, the Arabic, secular English-language, Christian and Israeli designations for the same body of water and for the surrounding area.

<sup>4</sup> See, among many others, Abu el-Haj, Nadia (2001) *Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, and Walidi, Khalid, ed. (1992) *All That Remains: the Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies. It is important to recognize that "propaganda cartography" is indulged in by Palestinian scholars as well; cf., *inter alia*, Cohen and Kliot (1992) "Place-Names in Israel's Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories," *Association of American Geographers* 82: 653-680.

and Christians lived together. It is also the site of a *moshav* (cooperative village). There is no attempt on the site to interpret the remains of Saffuriyah, though the pre-1948 elementary school is being restored. The site is fenced and visitors must pay an entrance fee to enter unless they are residents of the Zippori *moshav*. According to an architect connected to the restoration of the site, the site was fenced and the admissions fee charged in order to keep Arab visitors out of the park.<sup>5</sup>

It is obvious that the history of the Arab community of Saffuriyah is being destroyed at Zippori National Park, and a concerted effort is being made to separate Arabs from tangible connection to the material remains of that history. It is equally important to note that a history of "liberal," "plural" Christian-Jewish coexistence – a characterization particularly sympathetic to the American ear – is at the same time being constructed and enshrined in a tourist attraction.

The Israeli examples demonstrate the power of landscape symbols to destroy and construct cultural histories, presences and present-day efficacy. These examples also begin to intimate that landscape transformation is not confinable to Israel, and not even to the project of nationalism: local decisions about cultural resources management are connected to the more extensive and powerful net of the globalized economy – and the importance of tourism within that larger context. With this in mind let us turn to consider the conservation of Islamic cultural remains in a predominantly Muslim context, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

### **A Christian Jordan**

Jordan is enormously rich in archaeological sites, boasting visually powerful remains from more than ten thousand years of vigorous human construction projects. While enormously valuable to the researcher, this historical record is perhaps more significant to Jordan, *qua* nation state, as a tourist attraction. There is a mutual relationship between foreign aid and the tourist market: Jordan's economic development is commonly thought to depend heavily on the success of its tourist industry.<sup>6</sup> The success of the tourist trade brings money into Jordan directly, in the form of tourism dollars, *per se*, and indirectly, as foreign assistance for tourism development and for other projects predicated on economic growth resulting from tourism. It is thus in the interests of the state to shape in positive ways the impressions of tourists, who come to Jordan overwhelmingly to visit archaeological and biblical sites.

Jordan is one enormous archaeological field, if one chooses to see it that way; apart from world-famous Petra and the decapolis city of Jerash there are copious Roman, Byzantine, and prehistoric sites, and a less well-known body of Mameluke, Ottoman and Jewish remains. Much of what we are about to say about the editing of the cultural

---

<sup>5</sup> Baumann

<sup>6</sup> It takes only a visit to Petra, the most lucrative tourist site in Jordan, to see the effects that slumping tourism has had on one of its liveliest local economies. At the time of writing USAID is presently investing hundreds of millions in projects which develop alternative income sources and support services for the residents of Wadi Musa (the area where Petra is located), who had become tourism-dependent before the second *intifada* and "September 11" decimated the tourist market in Jordan.

landscape could be applied as easily to these sites (excepting Petra and Jerash) as to the early Islamic sites to be discussed. What makes Jordan's early Islamic remains a particularly pointed example of landscape transformation is, first, that Jordan is 94% Muslim (CIA 2003); second, the early Islamic remains in Jordan constitute one of the richest records of early Islam anywhere. The only comparable body of remains is in Syria, which has long been less accessible to researchers and tourists alike. While it is unacceptable scholarly practice to privilege the value of one period of history over another, it is arguable that unique bodies of remains might be conserved with special energy and attention. The reverse principle seems to be at work in Jordan.

Fieldwork conducted in Jordan between March, 2002 and January, 2004 documented signs and roads as a measure of government policy regarding the development of cultural heritage sites.<sup>7</sup> For the sake of conciseness, the following remarks concentrate on the signage for the Desert Highway and the Madaba road.<sup>8</sup> Since the preparations for the Arab Economic Summit convened in `Amman in October, 1995, there has been a concerted effort to develop a system of internationally interpretable road signs throughout Jordan. Most signs are now written in both Arabic and English and many are marked with non-text icons.<sup>9</sup> There are three basic categories of signs: traffic signs (white on blue, black on white), pilgrimage signs (white on green), and tourist signs (cream on brown). Before 1995 there was no systematic attempt to distinguish signs for tourist attractions, so in many cases the old blue-and-white signs are still in place. These signs, traces of an earlier heuristic, afford some curious insights into the logic of the new system.

Qasr al-`Amman, Deir al-Kahf, al-Qastal and al-Mushatta – all significant,<sup>10</sup> visually impressive Islamic sites – lie on or within a few kilometers of the Desert Highway. On the southbound highway between Qatrania and `Amman there are eighteen brown tourist signs, including signs for the airport and a little-league stadium. Of the eighteen, six signal Christian sites, none signal Islamic sites. There is no sign even for the turnoff to Qusayr `Amra, one of only two UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Jordan (along with Petra). On the northbound highway there are four brown tourist signs: three signal Christian sites, one is for Qusayr `Amra. Why the single sign for the UNESCO site is placed on the northbound side is unclear: the density of private sector signs is much heavier on the southbound side than the northbound, indicating that it is more profitable

---

<sup>7</sup> While there is foreign development aid, private development and scholarly research money involved in other aspects of site development, signs and access are predominantly Jordanian government inputs and therefore reflect Jordanian policy more accurately. Signs and roads are the *sine qua non* of tourist infrastructure, and as such they indicate the value of a site as perceived by the state.

<sup>8</sup> The Desert Highway must be traveled to reach the airport, the Israeli border, one of the two main routes to the Eastern Highway to `Iraq or Sa`udi Arabia, Petra or either of the other two north-south highways. Their importance as major arteries is evident from the fact that both are the most heavily signed roads in Jordan. By way of comparison, the Desert Highway has in some places as many as twenty-two *private sector* signs per kilometer, whereas the Jafr Road, 250 km of first class highway, sports not a single private sector sign.

<sup>9</sup> We do not have time to detail this matter here, but it is worth noting that there are no recognisably Muslim symbols used as icons, while cruciform symbols appear for at least four sites.

<sup>10</sup> "Significance" is here evaluated from either an historical or religious perspective, and all have been developed at some expense. It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the terms of site evaluation.

to advertise to the heavier southbound traffic. Interestingly, five of the old blue road-signs remain on this section of highway: three are for Islamic sites (Khan az-Zabib and Qasr Tubah), two are for Umm ar-Rasas, a Christian site. Only the Umm ar-Rasas signs have been replaced with new brown iconic signs.

On the Madaba Road and within Madaba on the four main traffic circles there are seventeen signs, eleven for Christian sites and none for Islamic sites. There are signs for Christian sites over an hour away (e.g., Mukawir), when there are considerably more significant and impressive Islamic (Qastal and Mushatta) within fifteen minutes. There are no signs at all for the latter.

The placement of signs is also puzzling. It is already odd that the signage for `Amra is located on the northbound highway. Even more bizarre is the fact that it is placed at the exit to Na`ur, which would lead the tourist to *midan sharq al-awsat*, a busy traffic circle deep in the industrial part of `Amman, difficult even for most Jordanians to find if they don't use the artery regularly. The easiest route to the Eastern Highway is to exit at the Madaba interchange – one might expect a sign for the UNESCO World Heritage Site here, where there are signs for Madaba and Mount Nebo on both the north- and southbound sides, but no. In short, the single sign for Qusayr `Amra is more like to hinder than to help. By way of contrast, on the fifteen southbound kilometers before the Madaba interchange and at the interchange itself there are seven brown tourist signs in addition to blue directional signs for Madaba and Christian sites in Madaba. On the fifteen kilometers of first-class<sup>11</sup> road between the interchange and the town there are seven more brown signs. It is virtually impossible *not* to find these sites, even if one is not looking for them.

This example is representative, repeated again and again throughout Jordan. It is difficult not to begin to see a landscape heavy with Christian history and virtually devoid of Islamic remains.

Perhaps more troubling is the way that signs for Islamic holy sites (*maqamat*) have been situated and distributed across Jordan's roadways. While signs for Christian pilgrimages sites are frequently seen on the heavily traveled roads under discussion, not a single sign for any of the thirty-eight *maqamat* is visible on first- or second-class highways. Every one is signed, even in the most remote villages – but never visibly from a heavily traveled tourist road.

Let us consider one example closely: Mt. Nebo, until quite recently known to most Arabic speakers as *siyagha*. Nebo is a holy site to both Christians and Muslims, to whom it is *maqam nabi allah musa*, "the Holy Site of the Prophet Musa (Moses)." According to tradition Mount Nebo is the site of Moses' death. Though there is another site so claimed on the west side of the Jordan river near Ariha/ Jericho, Mt. Nebo is one of the best-known and most-visited sites in Jordan and, except for Petra, the most

---

<sup>11</sup> Road quality is evaluated in terms of width and number of lanes, quality of pavement, elevation above surrounding terrain, the presence of reinforced culverts and safety features such as raised guard-strips, reflectors and foglines, and whether or not curves are banked.

heavily signed (eighteen brown tourist signs). The top of Nebo is now dominated by a Franciscan church and monastery, and since 1933 the Franciscans have pursued archaeological research there. In the forecourt of the Church is a huge, twentieth century metal cross visible from miles around. The site is walled and gated and there is no trace of Islamic heritage evident.

There are, in fact, two new pilgrimage signs which signal that Nebo is a *maqam*: incredibly, both of them face away from the main road and are visible only when approaching the site from dead-end, fourth-class, partially paved roads. Only the blank metal backs of the signs are visible from the main thoroughfare. They are solidly installed, new signs – they are intentionally placed. There are no longer any official references to *siyagha*, though one restaurant sign refers to it. Approaching Mt. Nebo from the Jordan Valley, however, there is a new brown sign for "Madaba" and "Nebo," with *jabal nibu* ("Mount Nebo") provided in Arabic. Just a few meters after the new sign, however, there remains an old blue-and-white sign that reads, in Arabic, *maqam nabi musa*, and below that in English, "Mount Nebo." This indicates that until very recently the old Muslim name was used at least in Arabic. This is no longer so. Now all of the eighteen brown signs use the Christianized name for the site *even in Arabic*.

If the Israeli examples suggested the power of landscape transformation to destroy and construct culture in the interests of nationalist ideology, what are we to take away from the Jordanian example? What emerges from the latter survey goes beyond policy which develops Christian pilgrimage sites because they are more profitable to the tourism industry than Islamic sites are. Signs to the *maqamat* are deliberately obscured; the money for the signs has been spent – why not display them to their best advantage? Names for sites such as Mt. Nebo have been shifted away from the traditional Arabic designations in favor of the use of western Christian epithets even in Arabic. Islamic heritage – history, religion, pilgrimage, and arguably Muslims themselves<sup>12</sup> – is deliberately edited from the landscape.

In a bizarre denouement, the very westerners who are supposedly being courted appear to disagree with the Jordanian government on the matter of what is worth conserving *even in the interests of tourism*. UNESCO has elevated only Petra and Qusayr `Amra, an Islamic site, to the status of "World Heritage Site." Museum with No Frontiers (MWNF), a cultural tourism concern promoted by the European Commission, chose to showcase in Jordan the fabulous palaces of the Umayyad dynasty. `Amra, Qastal, Mushatta, Tubah, `Amman, Deir al-Kahf, and Umm al-Walid were all selected as primary sites for the MWNF catalogue. It seems odd that the preferences of major western arbiters of cultural significance should be so signally ignored.

---

<sup>12</sup> To site only one example of many: considerable investment, including a new road which runs over five kilometers through rough terrain to the site, has been devoted to a "pilgrimage" site called "Mar Elias," north of `Ajlun. *Maqam* "Mar Elias," actually known and used by both Muslims and Jordanian Christians in honor of St. George, is located just northwest of `Amman, in a village called Mahas. The only sign for the latter is located on a third class road in Mahas itself.

This disjuncture provides a clue: direct profits from tourism *per se* earn a pittance compared to the millions the United States dispenses each year for *tourism development*. To cite only one example, again typical, in 2002 USAID committed US\$8.4 million for tourist infrastructure at Maghtas, purportedly the site of Jesus' baptism (Dajani, 2002).<sup>13</sup> Even if 50,000 visitors were to visit Maghtas in a year<sup>14</sup> the government would gross only US\$350,000. The second Palestinian *intifada*, the events of September 11, 2001, and now the costly occupation of `Iraq have decimated Jordanian tourism. Since it is not the dollars they spend, *per se*, but the sense of economic possibility that they represent, tourists must be courted into a landscape as free as possible of any hint of threat or discomfort.

Thus, ironically, it is important for Jordan to promote a particular tourism that distances the state from things Islamic and from the particular fragrance of danger they carry for the U.S., precisely in order to sustain the sense that tourism development is still a worthwhile investment of foreign aid. Since any Euramerican *perception* of Jordan as Muslim-identified, militant or hazardous is costly on many levels, it becomes vitally important for the regime to configure itself as secular and western-identified. Ultimately the educated opinions of organizations such as UNESCO or MWNF matter as little as the less rarified tastes of the Christian tourists: cultural resources management policy is being shaped by the big money that passes from state to state in the context of global politics.

## Conclusions

Cultural remains are powerful symbols which compose a text inscribed on the landscape and read by everyone who travels through it. To erase the material remains of a culture is one part of the process of erasing its historical and contemporary political efficacy, not to mention its identity. It is equally important, however, to recognize that all editing of this text – all landscape transformation – *constructs* a narrative of cultural identity for those who inhabit it.

In the Israeli example discussed here the well-known process of the destruction of Palestinian cultural remains is accompanied by a process of identity-construction, accomplished by transforming the landscape, editing it and interpreting it with revised maps. What is interesting for our purposes is that this process of identity *construction* is aimed not only at Israelis, but at the Euramerican tourist market.

In the Jordanian example Islamic cultural remains are obscured to construct a landscape distanced from both the Islamic present and past. This construction helps to make Jordan a cultural landscape welcoming to western tourism, which in turn represents the landscape as territory fertile for the investment of foreign aid, primarily from the U.S. There is a strong parallel here to the colonial discourse, which emptied the landscape of people in order to colonize it (Fisk, 2002: 12-47 *passim*) and to the related missionary discourse which sought to "save," "improve," and "develop" cultures perceived as culturally lesser (Said, 1979: 216ff). Israel still employs this discourse as a

---

<sup>13</sup> There are five – four are on the West Bank.

<sup>14</sup> In the first eight months of 2002 Maghtas recorded 31,368 visitors (Dajani, 2002).

rationale for settlement, for making the "desert" bloom (Katriel, 1997: 155ff). In this discourse, however, the colonial power "imagines" the landscape *tabula rasa*. In the Jordanian example the discourse has been internalized, and the economically poorer, "less developed" state self-edits to invite investment and foreign aid ("development").

What will it mean to lose the visible face of Islam on the landscape? What will it mean to a population to lose that tangible connection to its past? What would it mean to be a majority population in a landscape dominated by symbols of a very tiny minority? Competing nationalisms and religious ideologies, economic realities and the dynamics of globalization are forcibly shaping the landscape of southwest Asia. Each state and even successive regimes within states continue to transform the cultural landscape to suit their particular interests and agenda. The commodification of cultural remains into "heritage tourism" shapes the landscape very unobtrusively into a consumable product (Silberman, 1995: 261),<sup>15</sup> which suggests that it would have to be transformed *periodically* to suit the market.

There is a powerful indication here that southwest Asia as a region should consider the matter of the conservation of Islamic cultural remains as a regional planning issue as important as water, trade and tourism. Regional policy should govern both conservation and maintenance of material remains and the infrastructure – access and signage – to support and interpret them. Finally, investment from the private and public sectors as well as the *`awqaf* should be encouraged to endow foundations, scholarships and research fellowships focused on cultural heritage conservation and interpretation. Otherwise southwest Asia may soon find its lands occupied by another culture.

## References

Abu el-Haj, Nadia (2001) *Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Addison, Erin (2004) "The Roads to Ruins: Accessing Islamic Heritage in Jordan," in Baram, Uzi and Rowan, Yorke, eds. (2004) *Marketing Heritage: Archaeology and the Consumption of the Past*, Walnut Creek: Alta Mira.

Baumann, Joel (2004) "Between Tourism and Nationalism: Israeli National Parks and the Politics of Historical Representation," in Baram, Uzi and Rowan, Yorke, eds. (2004) *Marketing Heritage: Archaeology and the Consumption of the Past*, Walnut Creek: Alta Mira.

Cohen, Saul B. and Kliot, Nurit (1992) "Place-Names in Israel's Ideological Struggle over the Administered Territories," *Association of American Geographers* 82: 653-680.

CIA World Factbook: Jordan, at [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jo.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/jo.html) (accessed: 28 January 2004).

---

<sup>15</sup> "The future of archaeological interpretation – and perhaps even historical interpretation... may thus no longer lie in the competing narratives of nation-states and would-be peoples, but between the archaeological sites that bear ideological messages and those that are designed for profit alone."

Dajani, Dalya (2002) "Baptism Site continues to see expansion," *The Jordan Times Online*, 9 September, 2002, at [www.jordantimes.com/sun/homenews/homenews9.html](http://www.jordantimes.com/sun/homenews/homenews9.html) (accessed 15 September 2002).

Fisk, Robert (2002) *Pity the Nation: the Abduction of Lebanon*, New York: Thunders Mouth/ Nation Books.

Katriel, Tamar (1997) "Remaking Place: Cultural Production in Israeli Pioneer Settlement Museums" in Ben Ari, Eyal and Bilu, Yoram, eds., *Grasping Land: Space and Place in Contemporary Israeli Discourse and Experience*, Albany: SUNY Press.

Kohl, Philip L. and Fawcett, Clare (1995) *Nationalism, politics, and the practice of archaeology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Said, Edward (1979) *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books.

Walidi, Khalid, ed. (1992) *All That Remains: the Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies.

[www.google.com](http://www.google.com), "Kinnaret" (accessed: 24 January 2004)

[www.google.com](http://www.google.com), "Khirbet al-Minya" (accessed: 24 January 2004)

[www.google.com](http://www.google.com), "Tabariyyah" (accessed: 24 January 2004)

[www.google.com](http://www.google.com), "Lake Tiberias" (accessed: 24 January 2004)